Uncertainty, entitativity, and group identification

Michael A. Hogg a,*, David K. Sherman b, Joel Dierselhuis a, Angela T. Maitner b, Graham Moffitt a

a School of Psychology, University of Queensland, Brisbane, Qld. 4072, Australia
b Department of Psychology, University of California, Santa Barbara, USA

Received 28 June 2005; revised 22 December 2005

Abstract

Two studies examined the effects of self-uncertainty and ingroup entitativity on group identification. From uncertainty reduction theory (Hogg, 2000), it was hypothesized that people would identify most strongly with their group if they felt self-conceptually uncertain and the group was highly entitative. Study 1 was a field experiment (N = 114) in which the perceived entitativity of participants’ political party was measured, and self-uncertainty was primed (high vs. low). Study 2 was a laboratory experiment (N = 89) with ad hoc non-interactive groups. Uncertainty was primed as in Study 1, but perceived entitativity was manipulated. In both cases the dependent variable was a multi-item measure of group identification. The hypothesis was fully supported in both studies—participants identified more strongly when they were uncertain and the group was highly entitative. Implications of this research for the role of uncertainty and social identity in extremism, orthodoxy, and ideological belief systems are discussed.

Keywords: Social identity; Uncertainty reduction; Entitativity; Intergroup behavior; Extremism

Groups serve many functions, and people affiliate for many reasons (Brown, 2000). One function and reason for affiliation is provision of an identity and associated consensual belief system that informs us who we are and how we should view and treat others, and how others will view and treat us. This identity function of groups has been elaborated by the social identity perspective (e.g., Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987; see Hogg, 2003, 2005a), which defines the group cognitively as three or more people who share the same social identity and views group identification as a feeling of belonging, a definition and evaluation of self in terms of shared ingroup attributes, and a belief that the group is central to one’s sense of self (e.g., Cameron, 2004). Identification generates group behaviors; for example ethnocentrism, conformity, cohesion, stereotyping, intergroup competition and discrimination (Hogg & Abrams, 1988).

Why and when do people identify with groups, and what properties of groups facilitate or strengthen identification? From a social identity perspective, identification may be motivated by self-enhancement (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), optimal distinctiveness (Brewer, 1991), and uncertainty reduction. In this article, we focus on the latter—the motivational role of subjective uncertainty reduction in group identification, as described by uncertainty reduction theory (Hogg, 2000). We test the proposition that uncertainty, particularly self-conceptual uncertainty, motivates identification, but that people prefer to identify with groups that are clearly defined and distinctive entities.

Although some uncertainty in our lives may be exciting (we like surprises), too much is uncomfortable, particularly if it is uncertainty about oneself in social context or about things that directly matter to or reflect on self-con-
ception. Generally, people strive to reduce feelings of uncertainty about themselves, their social world and their place within it—they like to know who they are and how to behave, and who others are and how they might behave. Being properly located in this way renders the social world and one’s place within it relatively predictable and allows one to plan effective action, avoid harm, know who to trust, and so forth.

Group identification may be a particularly efficient and immediate way to reduce or fend off this kind of self-conceptual uncertainty. From a social identity perspective, group identification is underpinned by self-categorization (Turner et al., 1987), which is associated with a wider social categorization process that brings into play group prototypes that describe how people (including oneself) will and ought to behave and interact with one another. Social categorization of self and others generates a sense of ingroup identification and belonging, and regulates perception, inference, feelings, behavior, and interaction to conform to prototype-based knowledge one has about one’s own group and relevant outgroups. Such prototypes are relatively consensual (‘we’ agree ‘we’ are like this, ‘they’ are like that)—thus, one’s world view and self-concept are relatively consensual (‘we’ agree ‘we’ are like this, ‘we’ agree ‘we’ are like that)—that is, one’s world view and self-concept are validated. Social categorization renders one’s own and others’ behavior predictable, and allows one to avoid harm, plan effective action, and know how one should feel and behave.

The social psychology literature is replete with uncertainty-related motives (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996; Sedikides & Strube, 1995; Sorrentino & Roney, 1999). However, uncertainty reduction theory has at least two features that differentiate it from related constructs: (a) uncertainty is not an invariant property of the person, but of the immediate or more enduring social context in which people find themselves, and (b) uncertainty is addressed through the process of self-categorization and group identification, not merely by making social comparisons—self-conception is centrally involved.

The original and most basic prediction from uncertainty reduction theory was that people identify more strongly with groups when they are feeling uncertain—uncertain about themselves, their behavior, what is expected of them, and so forth. Merely being in a group, in the sense of having the attributes of a social category, may not be enough to produce identification—uncertainty may be required to trigger the process.

This prediction has been supported in a series of studies summarized by Hogg (2000). The general paradigm for this research uses minimal groups in which (a) contextual subjective uncertainty and/or type of uncertainty is manipulated, (b) participants are explicitly categorized or not (or category salience is manipulated), and/or (c) prototypical properties of the category are manipulated. The key dependent measures are self-reported group identification and behavioral measures of resource allocations. A number of experiments have shown that ingroup identification and ingroup discrimination only occur and occur signifi-
not the same as ingroup entitativity, and may actually be the least important component of entitativity (e.g., Crump & Hamilton, 2004; Hamilton et al., 2004).

Entitativity is better investigated in a series of four studies by Castano, Yzerbyt, and Bourguignon (2003), who manipulated different aspects of entitativity and measured identification with the European Union (EU). Entitativity increased identification but only, or more strongly, among those with less extreme attitudes towards the EU. Self-uncertainty was not measured or manipulated—it can only be speculated that those with less extreme attitudes may have been less self-conceptually uncertain. The main message of this research is that people identify more strongly with high entitativity groups (e.g., Castano, 2004; Yzerbyt, Castano, Leyens, & Paladino, 2000)—which is consistent with Lickel et al.’s (2000) finding that ingroup entitativity perceptions were significantly correlated with reported importance of the group to self.

The two studies reported in the present article explicitly test the effect of self-uncertainty on group identification as a function of ingroup entitativity. In both studies we manipulated self-uncertainty (uncertainty about self has not been directly manipulated in previous tests of uncertainty reduction theory) and measured group identification. Study 1 was a field experiment in which we also measured perceptions of the entitativity of the political party that participants supported. Study 2 was a laboratory experiment in which we manipulated perceptions of the entitativity of a non-interactive ad-hoc laboratory group that participants believed they were part of. We predicted an interaction between uncertainty and entitativity. Participants would identify most strongly when they felt uncertain and the group had high entitativity—that is, entitativity would moderate the effect of uncertainty on identification, and uncertainty would moderate the effect of entitativity on identification.

Study 1

In Study 1 we took advantage of a national election in Australia. To test the hypothesis above, we measured how much of an entity our participants felt the political party they supported was, primed them to feel uncertain or not about themselves, and measured how much they felt they identified with their party.

Method

Design and participants

Participants were 66 male and 48 female undergraduates (N = 114) at a large Australian university (18- to 46-years, M = 21). They could only take part if they were eligible to vote (the voting age is 18), and they supported one of the two major political parties—56 were Labor Party supporters, and 58 Liberal Party supporters (in Australia, the Labor Party is liberal, the Liberal Party conservative). Participants were randomly allocated to the high or low uncertainty prime condition.

Procedure and measures

A male/female research team approached students on campus and invited them to complete a questionnaire about student political attitudes—data were collected in May 2004 in anticipation of the October Australian federal election. If they agreed, they were told that only supporters of the Labor or Liberal parties were eligible to participate. Out of 159 participants who agreed to participate, 114 were eligible and were given the questionnaire to complete there and then.

The first question confirmed party affiliation. Participants were then asked to think about people who consider themselves supporters of their party, and were asked “how much of a group do you feel they are” (1 not very much a group, 9 very much a group). This was our measure of ingroup entitativity— in a single question it goes beyond only similarity, only homogeneity or only distinctiveness perceptions, and captures the essence of the broader construct of entitativity (e.g., Brewer & Harasty, 1996; Hamilton & Sherman, 1996).

Next, self-uncertainty was manipulated using a priming procedure. Participants were asked to spend a few moments thinking about those aspects of their life that made them feel uncertain (certain) about themselves, their lives and their future, and then to write in the spaces provided a few sentences about the three aspects that made them feel most uncertain (certain). van den Bos (2001) and McGregor and colleagues (McGregor & Marigold, 2003; McGregor, Zanna, Holmes, & Spencer, 2001) have used a different but related procedure, in which participants focused on an unresolved personal dilemma, to manipulate what they call personal uncertainty. McGregor et al. (2001) found no effect of their manipulation on state self-esteem.

Immediately after the uncertainty prime, participants answered nine questions, adapted from previous social identity research (e.g., Hains, Hogg, & Duck, 1997; Hogg & Hains, 1996; Hogg, Hains, & Mason, 1998), measuring how much they identified with their political party. These items focused on self-importance of and liking/familiarization for the party and its supporters, similarity and goodness of fit to the party, and identification, belonging and ties with the party (1 not very much, 9 very much). They formed a reliable group identification scale (α = .93, M = 4.36, SD = 1.74).

After indicating their age and sex participants were thanked, offered chocolates in appreciation of their participation, and debriefed and probed for suspicions.

Results

Since Labor and Liberal party supporters did not differ on the two predictor variables of entitativity and uncertainty, nor on the dependent measure of identification, F(1, 112) < 1.95, p > .165, we did not incorporate party affiliation in the analyses.
The effectiveness of the self-uncertainty prime was confirmed in a pilot study\(^1\). However we also had two independent raters, from the same population as the participants, read what each participant had written in response to the uncertainty prime and indicate how certain or uncertain they felt that participant would have felt at the time (1 certain, 9 uncertain). Interrater reliability was significant (r(111) = .25, p = .008) so we averaged the raters’ ratings. One-way ANOVA revealed a significant main effect for uncertainty—high uncertainty participants were rated as feeling more self-uncertain (M = 6.55) than low uncertainty participants (M = 3.72), F(1, 109) = 285.88, p < .001.

To test the experimental hypothesis a step-wise multiple regression with uncertainty and entitativity (Step 1) and their interaction (Step 2) as predictors, was performed on identification. Following Aiken and West (1991), predictors were centered and simple slopes analyses conducted for the significant interaction.

The regression was significant at Step 1, \( R^2 = .11, R^2_{adj} = .09, F(2, 109) = 6.38, p = .002. \) Entitativity was the only significant predictor, \( \beta = .33, t = 3.74, p < .001 \)—identification increased with increasing entitativity. At Step 2 the interaction of entitativity and uncertainty significantly improved prediction of identification, \( R^2_{ch} = .05, F_{ch}(1, 108) = 5.83, p = .017, \beta = .21, t = 2.42, p = .017. \) Since uncertainty significantly moderated the main effect of entitativity on identification, we examined and plotted the simple slope of entitativity at low (1 SD below the mean) and high (1 SD above the mean) levels of uncertainty (see Fig. 1). Entitativity significantly increased identification under high (\( \beta = .55, t = 4.25, p < .001 \)) but not low uncertainty (\( \beta = .12, t = .96. \)).

Simple slopes analyses with entitativity as the moderator revealed the slopes for uncertainty to be non-significant at high (\( \beta = .20, t = 1.60 \)) and low (\( \beta = -.23, t = -1.81, p = .073 \)) levels of group entitativity.

### Discussion

As predicted from uncertainty reduction theory, group identification was influenced by the interaction of self-uncertainty, which was successfully manipulated, and perceived political ingroup entitativity. Where self-uncertainty was high, people identified more strongly with high than low entitativity groups. Where self-uncertainty was low, there was no significant relationship between entitativity and identification. Although the interaction supports our moderation hypotheses it should be noted that in contrast to previous studies (see Hogg, 2000) uncertainty alone did not predict identification—most likely because, in contrast to previous studies, we manipulated self-uncertainty directly and used real groups and real beliefs about their entitativity.

Two strengths of this study are that we directly manipulated feelings of self-uncertainty, which has not been done in previous tests of uncertainty reduction theory, and we measured identification with ‘real’ groups that people belonged to. The limitation is that entitativity was measured, and may have associated with it other factors, apart from entitativity beliefs, that influenced identification. This is addressed by Study 2—a conceptual replication using a different paradigm to allow us to plausibly manipulate perceived ingroup entitativity.

### Study 2

Study 2 adopted a computerized minimal group paradigm that has been used in past research to make participants believe they are in a small discussion or task-oriented group that does not interact face-to-face but communicates and exchanges information via computer (e.g., Reid & Hogg, 2005). This allowed us to provide credible feedback that their group was high or low in entitativity, prime them as in Study 1 to feel more or less uncertain about themselves, and then measure how strongly they identified with the group—using almost identical measures to Study 1. As for Study 1, we predicted that identification would be strongest among participants who both felt uncertain and believed that their group had high entitativity.

### Method

#### Design and participants

Participants were 39 male and 50 female undergraduates (N = 89) at a large Australian university (17- to 28-years,
They participated in what they believed was a computer-mediated group decision making experiment in exchange for $10 (USS 7), and were randomly assigned to conditions formed by the manipulation of two independent variables—self-uncertainty (low, high) and ingroup entitativity (low, high). The dependent variable was a multi-item group identification measure.

**Procedure and measures**

Participants arrived at a lab that had eight cubicles equipped with computers. They were seated and led to believe that six to eight of the cubicles were occupied for the session, that the computers were interconnected, and that the experiment would be run via the computers. They were seated and led to participate in an interactive computer-mediated ‘chat room’ with the other members of their group—their group being those present at the session. The group’s task was to evaluate, and make group decisions, about hypothetical job applicants.

After indicating their age and sex, participants completed a self-description and self-evaluation questionnaire, which had four sociability, five self-confidence and four self-esteem statements, taken from standard scales. This questionnaire was ostensibly to allow the experimenter to provide participants with information about their group. It served no other purpose in the experiment.

On completing the questions, participants waited for 60 s while the computer performed computations. The computer then presented results in the form of two summary statistics—an $z$-coefficient and a $z$ score. In the high entitativity conditions the values of $z$ and $z$ were .86 and 2.98, and in the low entitativity condition they were .41 and .95. While participants studied the feedback, the experimenter explained in detail what each statistic meant, and what it said about their group. High entitativity participants were told that members had responded very similarly to each other and that the group was very different to other groups that had taken part. Low entitativity participants were told that members had responded very differently to each other and that the group was very similar to other groups that had taken part.

To complement this homogeneity and distinctiveness dimension of the entitativity manipulation, the experimenter proceeded to prime participants about what their group was going to do, and how this was the best way to approach the group task. In the high entitativity condition they were told that the group was going to organize itself, via the ‘chat room,’ with a clear division of labor, a leadership structure, and a set of agreed principles about how to approach the task. In the low entitativity condition they were told that the group members were going to introduce themselves to one another, via the ‘chat room’, but leave individuals to decide how they wanted to do the task themselves. In this way, the high entitativity group was well structured, with clear roles, and a distinct and shared prototype, whereas the low entitativity group was poorly structured, with unclear roles, and an indistinct and relatively unshared prototype.

Participants were now told that before the group task they would answer a few more questions about themselves, their group, and the upcoming task. First they completed nine entitativity checks. They were asked how cohesive, organized, hierarchical, purposeful, structured, and clearly defined they felt their group was, how distinct it was from other groups, how similar members were to one another, and whether it had defined roles or functions (1 not very much, 9 very much). These nine items formed a reliable scale, $z = .91$.

Next they were asked to spend a few moments thinking about those aspects of their life that made them feel certain (uncertain) about themselves, their lives and their future, and then to write in the spaces provided a few sentences about the three aspects that made them feel most uncertain. This is the same self-uncertainty manipulation as used in Study 1. Immediately after the uncertainty manipulation participants completed eight group identification items (1 not very much, 9 very much), which were based on and almost identical to Study 1. They formed a reliable group identification scale, $z = .94$. The experiment was now concluded and participants were debriefed and probed for suspicions.

**Results**

Cells did not differ in sex composition; but, despite random allocation, there was a significant interaction of uncertainty and entitativity on participant age, $F(1, 85) = 13.58, p < .001, \eta^2 = .14$; cell means ranged from 19.5 to 21.9 years. Because this is a meaningful age difference among Australian undergraduates (representing a difference between second and fourth year students) we conducted all analyses with age as a covariate (reported analyses did not change significantly if age was not a covariate).

Two-way ANCOVA, with age as a covariate, on the composite entitativity check revealed a large and significant main effect for entitativity, $F(1, 84) = 129.22, p < .001, \eta^2 = .61$—participants in the high entitativity condition felt the group had higher entitativity than participants in the low entitativity condition ($M$s = 6.13 and 3.77). No other effects were significant, $p > .500$.

The effectiveness of the uncertainty manipulation resides in the pilot study described in Footnote 1. However, the two independent raters used to rate what participants had written in Study 1 performed the same rating task on what participants had written in Study 2. Interrater reliability was significant ($r(89) = .63, p < .001$) so we averaged their ratings. One-way ANOVA revealed a significant main effect for uncertainty—high uncertainty participants were rated as feeling more self-uncertain ($M = 6.58$) than low uncertainty participants ($M = 3.40$), $F(1, 87) = 272.12, p < .001$.

To test the experimental hypothesis, we conducted a two-way ANCOVA on identification. Participants identified more strongly under high ($M = 5.79$) than low
In low entitativity groups had a mean identified, these main effects were qualified by the predicted interaction between uncertainty and entitativity, $F(1, 84) = 37.01, p < .001, \eta^2 = .31$. However, as predicted, these main effects were qualified by the predicted interaction between uncertainty and entitativity, $F(1, 84) = 8.05, p = .006, \eta^2 = .09$ see Fig. 2. High uncertainty participants in high entitativity groups identified significantly more strongly ($M = 6.98$) than low uncertainty participants in high entitativity groups ($M = 4.72$), $F(1, 84) = 35.10, p < .001, \eta^2 = .30$, and than high uncertainty participants in low entitativity groups ($M = 4.61$), $F(1, 84) = 42.33, p < .001, \eta^2 = .34$. Low uncertainty participants in low entitativity groups had a mean identification score of 3.93, which was not significantly affected by increased uncertainty ($F(1, 84) = 3.06, p = .084, \eta^2 = .04$), or by increased entitativity ($F(1, 84) = 3.91, p = .051, \eta^2 = .05$).

**Discussion**

Controlling for participant age, which differed between conditions, the effects of self-uncertainty and group entitativity (both cleanly and effectively manipulated) on the composite identification measure were exactly as predicted. Identification was strongest among uncertain participants in high entitativity groups—uncertainty increased identification but only when the group was high in entitativity, and participants identified more strongly with high than low entitativity groups but only when they were uncertain.

**General discussion**

From a social identity perspective, one critical function of groups is to provide people with a social identity that evaluates and defines self in group prototypical terms, prescribes perception, affect and behavior, and structures social interaction. In this article, we focus on subjective uncertainty reduction as a key motivation for group identification—identification buffers uncertainty, particularly about or related to self, precisely because social identity prescribes behavior, structures interaction, and so forth. Past research has shown that people are indeed more likely to identify, and to identify more strongly, with a group if they are feeling uncertain, particularly about things that are relevant to or reflect on self, and that identification can reduce uncertainty (see Hogg, 2000).

The present research tests a development of uncertainty reduction theory, which states that the effect of self-uncertainty on identification is moderated by perceived group entitativity (Hogg, 2004). When feeling uncertain about themselves in a particular context, people prefer to identify with, and identify more strongly with, groups that are more distinctive, more clearly structured, and associated with clearer prototypes. Such high entitativity groups may be more effective at reducing self-conceptual uncertainty, and consequently people would be more likely to identify with them. We predicted that people would identify most strongly with a group when they felt uncertain and they believed the group had high entitativity.

This prediction was fully supported by the two experiments reported here—a field experiment where we measured how entitative participants felt their political party was, and a lab experiment where we manipulated the entitativity of non-interactive groups. In both experiments we directly primed self-uncertainty to be high or low (a similar priming procedure used by McGregor et al. (2001) did not significantly affect self-esteem), and measured group identification. Previous tests of uncertainty reduction theory have not manipulated self-uncertainty directly.

Together, these studies provide good evidence, across “real” groups and ad hoc lab groups, that people identify more with high than low entitativity groups (entitativity measured or manipulated) but only when they are contextually self-uncertain, and that increased uncertainty strengthens identification only when the group is highly entitative. These studies are a significant advance on previous related studies (e.g., Castano et al., 2003; Jetten et al., 2000; also see Hogg, 2000)—they manipulate self-uncertainty directly as opposed to manipulating or measuring perceptual uncertainty or only inferring uncertainty; they manipulate or measure perceived entitativity as an integrated perception rather than focus on separate isolated components of entitativity, such as homogeneity; and they find effects on a well-tried direct measure of identification, rather than indirect measures of stereotypic perception. We believe we have provided the first conclusive evidence that perceived group entitativity moderates the effect of self-uncertainty on group identification. In addition, these studies link the uncertainty reduction literature, showing that entitativity moderates the self-uncertainty–identification relationship, with the entitativity literature, showing that self-uncertainty moderates the entitativity–identification relationship.

---

2 The interaction was also significant when age was not a covariate, $F(1, 85) = 4.02, p = .048$. 

---

**Fig. 2. Study 2, identification as a function of uncertainty and ingroup entitativity.**

(M = 4.33) uncertainty, $F(1, 84) = 31.43, p < .001, \eta^2 = .27$, and with high ($M = 5.85$) than low ($M = 4.27$) entitativity groups, $F(1, 84) = 37.01, p < .001, \eta^2 = .31$. However, as predicted, these main effects were qualified by the predicted interaction between uncertainty and entitativity, $F(1, 84) = 8.05, p = .006, \eta^2 = .09$ see Fig. 2. High uncertainty participants in high entitativity groups identified significantly more strongly ($M = 6.98$) than low uncertainty participants in high entitativity groups ($M = 4.72$), $F(1, 84) = 35.10, p < .001, \eta^2 = .30$, and than high uncertainty participants in low entitativity groups ($M = 4.61$), $F(1, 84) = 42.33, p < .001, \eta^2 = .34$. Low uncertainty participants in low entitativity groups had a mean identification score of 3.93, which was not significantly affected by increased uncertainty ($F(1, 84) = 3.06, p = .084, \eta^2 = .04$), or by increased entitativity ($F(1, 84) = 3.91, p = .051, \eta^2 = .05$).
Our studies also extend Pickett and colleagues’ research. Pickett and colleagues (e.g., Pickett & Brewer, 2001; Pickett, Silver, & Brewer, 2002) argue that the relationship between identification and group entitativity/inclusiveness is moderated by motivational states, and show that one motivational moderator is need for assimilation/differentiation as specified by optimal distinctiveness theory. Our studies show that self-conceptual uncertainty, as specified by uncertainty reduction theory, is another powerful moderator of the entitativity-identification relationship.

Our research has implications for McGregor et al.’s compensatory conviction model. Based on self-affirmation theory (Steele, 1988), compensatory conviction is a hydraulic motivational model which argues that when people feel uncertain in one domain they compensate for this by “spontaneously emphasizing certainty and conviction about unrelated attitudes, values, personal goals, and identifications” (McGregor et al., 2001, p. 473; also see McGregor & Marigold, 2003). Compensatory conviction research focuses mainly on uncertainty-sponsored hardening of expressed attitudes towards social issues, and has recently (e.g., McGregor & Marigold, 2003) investigated the moderating role of self-esteem as an individual difference variable. Although it provides some data showing uncertainty-sponsored hardening of intergroup attitudes and affirmation that particular activities define self (McGregor et al., 2001), compensatory conviction is not a motivational account of psychological identification with a social group. Because it states that people compensate for uncertainty in one domain by expressing conviction in another, it cannot easily account for the uncertainty reduction theory finding that the uncertainty-identification relationship is moderated by being categorized (e.g., Grieve & Hogg, 1999; see Hogg, 2000), nor for the moderating role of entitativity reported in the present article. Uncertainty reduction theory focuses on group identification, not affirmation or conviction, as a response to self-uncertainty, and thus it predicts that factors related to group membership, such as inclusion, categorization and entitativity, will influence how strongly people identify with a group as a response to self-uncertainty.

One implication of our research is for an uncertainty reduction analysis of extremism (Hogg, 2004, 2005b). We can speculate that chronic and extreme levels of uncertainty, perhaps associated with personal or widespread life or societal crises, may motivate people to identify strongly, as “true believers” (Hoffer, 1951), with highly entitative groups—a process where people become entrepreneurs of entitativity, working diligently to perceptually, rhetorically, and actually increase their groups entitativity. In extreme cases such groups may have orthodox and ideological belief systems, have powerful leaders and zealous followers, be harsh on marginal members and dissidents, and generally resemble extremist or ‘totalist’ groups (e.g., Baron, Crawley, & Paulina, 2003). Extreme societal uncertainty may tighten the iron grip of ideology (Hogg, 2005b) and spawn orthodoxy and extremism via social identification (cf. Marsella, 2004; Staub, 1989; Taylor & Louis, 2004).

References


